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Privilege in the Age of Hackers
“Dance like no one is watching; email like it may one day be
read aloud in a deposition.”1
INTRODUCTION
In 2014, a group hacked Sony Pictures Entertainment
servers and made public Sony’s financial information, along with
engrossingly candid email exchanges between its executives.2 A
year later, hackers released the email addresses, partial credit
card information, and sexual preferences of over thirty million
Ashley Madison users.3 Shortly after the release of this data, two
different search tools appeared online4 allowing interested
Internet users to discover who had an account with the “Life is
Short. Have an Affair” dating website.5 In 2016, over 100 media
organizations published coverage of 11.5 million documents
obtained through a hack of a Panamanian law firm, Mossack
Fonseca.6 The documents revealed financial assets of celebrities,
athletes, and world leaders and came to be known as the
“Panama Papers.”7 In the final weeks leading up to the 2016
presidential election, WikiLeaks8 released a treasure trove of
1 Olivia Nuzzi (@Olivianuzzi), TWITTER (Dec. 13, 2014, 1:18 PM), https://
twitter.com/olivianuzzi/status/543877654576107520 [https://perma.cc/MJC6-6HBY].
2 Sam Biddle, Everything You Need to Know About Sony’ s Unprecedented
Hacking Disaster, GAWKER (Dec. 15, 2014), http://sonyhack.gawker.com/everything-you-
need-to-know-about-sonys-unprecedented-h-1671217518 [https://perma.cc/CLJ9-FHB8].
3 Daniel Victor, The Ashley Madison Data Dump, Explained, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
19, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/20/technology/the-ashley-madison-data-dump-
explained.html [https://perma.cc/7A39-GGQN]. The Hill reported that 15,000 government
emails were revealed in the hack. Cory Bennett, 15,000 Government Emails Revealed in
Ashley Madison Leak, HILL (Aug. 19, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/
251431-ashley-madison-leak-appears-real-includes-thousands-of-government-emails
[https://perma.cc/LUH9-HRF8].
4 Victor, supra note 3.
5 Bennett, supra note 3.
6 Susan Miller, Panama Papers Explainer: What You Should Know, USA
TODAY (Apr. 3, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/04/03/panama-papers-
explainer-what-you-should-know/82591116/ [https://perma.cc/5JGD-YLWL].
7 See id.
8 According to its website, “WikiLeaks specializes in the analysis and
publication of large datasets of censored or otherwise restricted official materials
involving war, spying and corruption. It has so far published more than 10 million
1818 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:4
emails from Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton’s national
campaign chairman, John Podesta.9 While the contents of the
emails were fairly mundane,10 the releases nevertheless
dominated news cycles, capturing the interest of and commentary
from voters, political operatives, and the media.11 Each of the
hacks has had far-reaching consequences, ranging from a prime
minister’s resignation,12 to exposure of national security
measures.13 Of course, each hack has also led to the fear that
documents and associated analyses.” What Is WikiLeaks, WIKILEAKS (Nov. 3, 2015),
https://wikileaks.org/What-is-Wikileaks.html [https://perma.cc/8VBX-PMZ4].
9 Peter Nicholas, WikiLeaks’ Clinton Emails Present Painful Dilemma, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/10/27/wikileaks-clinton-
emails-present-painful-dilemma/; Politico Staff, WikiLeaks’ Assange Denies Russia
Behind Podesta Hack, POLITICO (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/
julian-assange-russia-john-podesta-wikileaks-230676 [https://perma.cc/MY79-DZRD].
10 See, e.g., 84 Rejected Clinton Campaign Slogans Revealed by WikiLeaks, FOX
NEWS INSIDER (Oct. 20, 2016), http://insider.foxnews.com/2016/10/20/84-rejected-clinton-
campaign-slogans-revealed-wikileaks [https://perma.cc/73M5-D8LS] (a compilation of
potential campaign slogans the Clinton campaign considered and rejected). But see
Byron Tau, WikiLeaks Reveals UFO Messages in Clinton Campaign Emails, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 10, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/10/10/wikileaks-reveals-ufo-%E2%
80%8Bmessages-in-clinton-campaign-emails/ [https://perma.cc/KLE5-TTN8] (The former
lead singer of power punk band Blink 182 emailed Podesta, writing about their mutual
interest in unidentified flying objects.).
11 The Wall Street Journal commented that “[n]ever in modern history has the
public gotten so vivid a window into how a campaign thinks and functions from its
earliest stages.” Nicholas, supra note 9. A member of the media commented that “[i]t’s
like reading one of the post-campaign books while the campaign is still going on.” Brian
Stelter (@brianstelter), TWITTER (Oct. 14, 2016, 9:50 PM), https://twitter.com/brianstelter/
status/786972357755740161 [https://perma.cc/636Z-HCHF]. Other journalists lamented
how nonjournalists scour through thousands of released emails and circulate snapshots of
conversations taken out of context and without analysis. Jesse Singal, ‘Citizen
Journalism’ Is a Catastrophe Right Now, and It’ll Only Get Worse, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 19,
2016), http://nymag.com/selectall/2016/10/citizen-journalism-is-a-catastrophe-itll-only-
get-worse.html [https://perma.cc/E92N-NUHM] (“Every time WikiLeaks drops a new
trove of Hillary Clinton or Democratic National Committee emails . . . countless citizen
journalists rush to pore over the documents, posting j’accuse screen-grabs ripped from
context that are quickly retweeted through huge, hyperactive networks of anti-Clinton
Twitter denizens.”).
12 Steven Erlanger et al., Iceland’s Prime Minister Steps Down Amid Panama
Papers Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/world/
europe/panama-papers-iceland.html [https://perma.cc/8ZYN-YN4C].
13 Greg Miller & Ellen Nakashima, WikiLeaks Says It Has Obtained Trove of
CIA Hacking Tools, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/wikileaks-says-it-has-obtained-trove-of-cia-hacking-tools/2017/
03/07/c8c50c5c-0345-11e7-b1e9-a05d3c21f7cf_story.html?utm_term=.461967c3b8b9
[https://perma.cc/X79P-QVTR]. For a detailed description of the impact of a cyberattack
on national critical infrastructure see Gabriel K. Park, Note, Granting an Automatic
Authorization for Military Response: Protecting National Critical Infrastructure from
Cyberattack, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 797, 801–07 (2013).
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anything sent by email may one day end up on the internet.14
According to security experts, this trend is only growing.15
These examples highlight a recurring theme that has
emerged in the increasingly digital world of the twenty-first
century: hackers breach a security system and post internal,
confidential information online for anyone to comb through. In
all of the above instances, hackers revealed, at best, inadequate
cybersecurity measures16 and, at worst, questionable legal
activities. Indeed, several hackers have publicly stated that
their motives are altruistic, that they want to provide the
public with critical information about major companies or
governmental agencies.17
This digital version of whistleblowing, called
“hacktivism,”18 is certainly attractive to the media, which has not
balked at widely covering the confidential communications
revealed by the hacks. News organizations can lean on broad
First Amendment protection that permits the publication of
illegally obtained materials,19 so long as the organization itself
14 See Olivia Oran, On Wall Street, a High-Ranking Few Still Avoid Email,
REUTERS (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-wall-street-email-idUSKBN
12W4F7 [https://perma.cc/HYZ9-9DHT].
15 See, e.g., Dino Grandoni, Ashley Madison, a Dating Website, Says
Hackers May Have Data on Millions, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/technology/hacker-attack-reported-on-ashley-madison-a-
dating-service.html [https://perma.cc/L8TB-N3JX] (“‘I think we’re going to see more of
it as people see how effective [hacking] is,’ said Bruce Schneier, chief technology officer
for Resilient Systems, a security company . . . .”); see Singal, supra note 11 (“We’re all
engaging in a big, messy experiment in how human beings produce, consume, and
disseminate knowledge . . . .”).
16 Infra Section III.A discusses the need for attorneys to take adequate
cybersecurity precautions to avoid hacks, or risk a court finding an implied waiver of
attorney-client privilege.
17 For example, after Wikileaks published thousands of documents allegedly
detailing the Central Intelligence Agency’s hacking tools, its founder, Julian Assange,
pledged to provide further information to several tech giants whose products the CIA
targeted. Assange stated that he would provide the tech companies with the
information so that they could identify and patch their own security flaws. Thomas
Fox-Brewster, Julian Assange: Wikileaks May Have Evidence CIA Spied on US
Citizens, FORBES (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/
03/09/julian-assange-cia-spying-american-citizens-apple-google-help/#1c2d614430a1
[https://perma.cc/M99N-FUWV]. Some experts expressed doubts, however, that Assange’s
motives were so pure when several days after releasing the files he still had not provided
Google or Microsoft with the additional information. Thomas Fox-Brewster, Google,
Microsoft Still Waiting on Wikileaks to Deliver CIA Hacking Tools, FORBES (Mar. 11,
2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/03/11/google-microsoft-waiting-
on-wikileaks-cia-exploits/#75de475754c9 [https://perma.cc/3YJH-YF5N].
18 Rajiv Gupta, The Panama Papers Signal a New Kind of Cyber Attack,
FORTUNE (Apr. 9, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/09/panama-papers-mossack-fonseca/
[https://perma.cc/45X3-B63G].
19 Hacks violate multiple federal laws relating to computer crimes. For a full
discussion of those crimes, see OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC. EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S.
ATTORNEYS, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES: COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SECTION CRIMINAL DIVISION (2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
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was not involved in the illegal activity.20 The constitutional
protection stems from the “assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free
press is a condition of a free society.”21 While the products of
the hacks fall squarely within that precedent, another reason
hacks appeal to journalists is precisely because of a
constitutional right that journalists do not enjoy: the right to
protect the anonymity of their sources. In Branzburg v. Hayes,
the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment confers to
journalists no special right to protect the identity of
confidential sources.22 In the four decades since that decision,
the press has had to rely on alternate methods to protect their
sources, much to the dismay of First Amendment scholars.23 In
contrast, hacktivism at once provides journalists with massive
amounts of newsworthy information as well as tools to protect
the source’s anonymity.24
These hacks also provide attorneys with enticing
opportunities to comb through previously confidential files, but
there is no constitutional protection for attorneys to review the
illegally obtained files.25 Imagine a scenario where an attorney
represents a client in litigation against Sony for discrimination
based on gender. After the publicized hack,26 it would be
tempting—and perhaps even required if the lawyer is to
criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ccmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9KY-FRUR]. For an
analysis of current legislation governing data security, see William Stanton, Note,
Securing America’s Data, 83 BROOK. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2018). Because of the
increase in hacking, there are calls for additional legislation to make a wider range of
activity unlawful. See generally Myra F. Din, Note, Breaching and Entering: When
Data Scraping Should Be a Federal Computer Hacking Crime, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 405
(2015).
20 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (“[A] stranger’s illegal
conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a
matter of public concern.”).
21 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
22 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 685 (1972).
23 Joel M. Gora, The Source of the Problem of Sources: The First Amendment
Fails the Fourth Estate, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1399, 1404–05 (2008).
24 For example, the hackers that exposed the Panama Papers communicated
with journalists remotely, via encrypted messages. One commenter noted that “[t]his
generation’s Watergate will be conducted through shared folders.” Gupta, supra note 18.
25 Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1073–74 (1991) (noting when
acting in their professional capacity, lawyers do not have the same First Amendment
rights as other citizens and “may be regulated under a less demanding standard than
that established for regulation of the press”).
26 Hacks occur frequently, but not all are publicly disclosed. James R.
Silkenat, Keynote Address: Privacy and Data Security for Lawyers, 38 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 449, 450, 450–51 (2015). This note focuses on hacks that were publicly
disclosed and extensively reported on.
2017] ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE AGE OF HACKERS 1821
“zealously assert[ ] the client’s position”27—for the attorney to
look through the hacked files for a smoking-gun email or memo
that proves Sony’s liability in the action. Indeed, the hypothetical
attorney would find ample ammunition to use against Sony in
the discrimination suit.28 As ethics and evidentiary rules stand,
however, it is not clear if an attorney may view leaked
documents, let alone use them as evidence in litigation.
While American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rule
4.4(b) governs attorney conduct when in receipt of documents
sent inadvertently, it is silent on attorneys in receipt of
documents obtained illegally.29 Coincidentally, this is the exact
scenario facing an attorney in the event of a publicized hack
and, because of the ABA’s silence, the attorney must face it
without clear guidance.30 Nor is there a clear rule from the
courts on the boundaries for attorneys when there is a publicized
hack. When determining what documents litigants may admit
as evidence in other contexts, such as when a disgruntled
employee sends an adversary confidential files, some courts have
precluded all use of documents and information obtained outside
the normal discovery process.31 Other courts have applied a test
similar to the one applied to news organizations, holding that there
is no basis for prohibiting the admission of stolen documents into
evidence so long as the party receiving the documents was not
involved in any illegal conduct in obtaining them and the
documents are not protected by attorney-client privilege.32
The ethical dilemma is compounded for attorneys when
the leaked documents are protected by attorney-client
27 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983)
[hereinafter MODEL RULES].
28 Hacked emails revealed, among other things, that Sony paid female
executives and actresses less than their male counterparts. William Boot, Exclusive:
Aaron Sorkin Thinks Male Film Roles Have Bigger ‘Degree of Difficulty’ Than Female
Ones, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/15/
exclusive-sony-emails-reveal-why-aaron-sorkin-thinks-hollywood-has-a-women-
problem.html [https://perma.cc/W7GC-EBRB].
29 MODEL RULES, supra note 27, r. 4.4(b). As discussed infra Sections I.B and
I.C, rule 4.4(b) does not provide guidance on what else the attorney in receipt of the file
should do or whether or not the privilege is waived by the inadvertent disclosure.
30 As discussed infra Section I.B, the ABA Committee on Ethics suggests that
attorneys should give notice to opposing counsel and obtain a judicial ruling as to the
admissibility of the document before even viewing it.
31 In re Shell Oil Refinery, 143 F.R.D. 105, 109 (E.D. La. 1992) (stating that
the plaintiffs could not make use of documents provided by one of the defendant’s
employees without authorization “unless the documents are publicly available or were
previously produced by [Defendant]”).
32 Madanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. 279, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“Such a sanction
would have no deterrent value since the punishment would fall on the blameless party
rather than on the wrongdoer who may have no interest in the litigation. Moreover, the
passive recipient of non-privileged material would be deprived of information to which
she would otherwise be entitled through the discovery process.”).
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privilege. The privilege is a bedrock legal principle that
protects a client from providing a court or adversary with
confidential communications exchanged in the course of
providing or receiving legal advice with an attorney, even if the
communications are relevant to litigation.33 The 11.5 million
documents that comprise the Panama Papers came from a law
firm, and thus it is almost certain that many of the documents
fall within the scope of attorney-client privilege.34 Aside from
Podesta’s tips on cooking risotto,35 WikiLeaks also posted at
least two legal memos written for the Clinton Foundation.36
Both memos—clearly labeled “Attorney-Client Privilege”—were
reported on by multiple news sites and were reposted in full on
the Washington Post’s and the Daily Caller’s websites.37
Each of these increasingly all-too-predictable hacks,
which make millions of documents available to anyone with an
Internet connection, diminishes the attorney-client privilege
protection. Attorney-client privilege is a pillar of the legal
profession, and its members should go to great lengths to
protect it.38 But when privileged documents are posted online
33 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). How the privilege is
established and its scope of protection is discussed infra Section I.A.
34 Josh Gerstein, Panama Papers Pose Ethics Issues for U.S. Prosecutors,
POLITICO (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/04/panama-papers-ethics-
issues-prosecutors-221609#ixzz45RD5dfLs [https://perma.cc/8PRK-D3NL].
35 Virginia Chamlee,Wikileaks: John Podesta’s Emails Offer the Secret to Creamy
Risotto, EATER (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.eater.com/2016/10/11/13246824/wikileaks-john-
podesta-clinton-risotto [https://perma.cc/Y3WB-LLW5] (describing an email in which
Podesta shares tips for making risotto).
36 Rosalind S. Helderman & Tom Hamburger, Inside ‘Bill Clinton Inc.’: Hacked
Memo Reveals Intersection of Charity and Personal Income, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/inside-bill-clinton-inc-hacked-memo-reveals-
intersection-of-charity-and-personal-income/2016/10/26/3bf84bba-9b92-11e6-b3c9-f662ad
aa0048_story.html [https://perma.cc/LB4L-YAJF]; Richard Pollock, BOMBSHELL: Clinton
Foundation Donors Expected ‘Benefits in Return for Gifts’, DAILY CALLER (Oct. 14, 2016),
http://dailycaller.com/2016/10/14/bombshell-clinton-foundation-donors-expected-benefits-in-
return-for-gifts/ [https://perma.cc/25Z6-S3NT].
37 One memo to the Clinton Foundation, written by Simpson Thatcher, &
Bartlett LLP attorneys, summarized the results of a governance review and details the
firm’s interviews with the Clinton Foundation’s board of directors and staff. Pollock,
supra note 36. The other memo was written to “help clarify [the aide’s] activities on behalf
of the President—both on behalf of non-profit Foundation activities and the management
of the [sic] his for-profit business opportunities.” Doug Band, Teneo to Victoria Bjorklund,
Jennifer Reynoso, Simpson Thatcher, President Bill Clinton, Clinton Foundation Founder
et al., (Nov. 16, 2011), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3183007/Memo-from-
Bill-Clinton-aide-on-how-Teneo.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YNA-DEUE]. It is worth noting
that, by virtue of writing this note, this author read the memo and is now citing directly
to it, potentially encouraging more attorneys to view and read it. All this despite the
memo’s clear label that it is protected by attorney-client privilege.
38 See Letter from James R. Silkenat, President of the Am. Bar Ass’n, to Gen.
Keith B. Alexander, Dir. of the Nat’l Sec. Agency (Feb. 20, 2014), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2014feb20_nsainterception
ofprivilegedinfo_l.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET6C-UE6T] (The president of
the ABA wrote to the National Security Agency’s Director and General Counsel
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and are the subject of constant news coverage, is the claim of
privilege ever so futile that a court should consider it
implicitly waived?
With massive document leaks moving from rare to
commonplace, courts and bar associations must provide clear
parameters to guide attorneys in deciding whether they may
ethically view or admit into evidence hacked documents that
may be protected by attorney-client privilege. Part I of this note
summarizes general rules that govern attorneys in receipt of
unsolicited and potentially privileged documents, as well as
factors that courts weigh when considering a party’s claim of
privilege, despite a document’s inadvertent or unauthorized
disclosure. Part II examines cases where litigants have argued
to exclude stolen or hacked documents from ever appearing in
court. Part III proposes that, in an age of hackers, courts should
shift the burden of protecting privileged files from the receiver of
the files to the party claiming the privilege. With these changes,
lawyers will have clear notice as to the ethical and procedural
boundaries in which they must operate when dealing with
publicized hacks that may include privileged files. To accomplish
this, ethics rules should permit attorneys to consume media
coverage of publicized hacks and courts should determine
whether the party claiming privilege took adequate cybersecurity
precautions against the all-too-predictable hack. These changes
would shift the burden to the party claiming privilege to
demonstrate that the file or files remain confidential, despite
the publicized hack.
I. CONCERNS FACING LAWYERS IN RECEIPT OF
UNSOLICITED FILES
While corporations and individuals must grapple with
how best to deal with the public relations nightmare of a
publicized leak of sensitive information, attorneys interested in
accessing the leaked files must navigate ethical dilemmas
posed by the hack with no clear guideposts. Attorney-client
privilege is not a constitutionally protected right; rather, it is
an evidentiary rule that exists to protect the communications
between a client and an attorney in the course of seeking and
providing legal advice.39 Note that the attorney-client privilege
requesting that procedures be put in place to prevent the erosion of the attorney-client
privilege in the event that the government was surveilling attorney communications
with clients.).
39 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). Note that the
attorney-client privilege is separate and apart from an attorney’s duty of confidentiality.
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is separate and apart from an attorney’s duty of confidentiality.
An attorney’s duty of confidentiality is governed by ABA Rule
1.6 and is a general ethics rule, not an evidentiary rule.40 This
note focuses on the ethics and evidentiary rules governing the
scope of the privilege and that severely restrict an attorney’s
ability to view and use as evidence documents that are subject
to privilege. A client’s ability to refuse to disclose to an
adversary confidential communications between him and his
attorney has long been recognized as a vital rule that leads to
“full and frank” discussions between the parties.41 These “full
and frank” discussions, the logic goes, result in more
comprehensive and effective legal representation because the
client is not worried that what he reveals to his attorney will
later be used against him in litigation.42 Because invoking the
privilege limits otherwise discoverable materials, it is in
tension with “the policy of broad disclosure” during litigation.43
Thus, courts generally construe the scope of privilege narrowly
“so that it applies only where confidentiality is deemed
necessary to encourage consultation with a lawyer.”44
As the Supreme Court noted in Upjohn Co. v. United
States, “if the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be
served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with
some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be
protected.”45 Courts have been willing to adjust the contours of
the privilege so long as the change furthers the underlying
principles of candid disclosure when parties give and receive
legal advice as well as efficient and accurate justice through
broad disclosure of relevant evidence during litigation.46 This
era of hackers releasing sensitive documents to the public calls
for courts to adapt how they apply the attorney-client privilege.
The hacks themselves are eroding attorney and client confidence
that their communications will remain confidential, not the post-
hack fear that the documents may be used in litigation.
An attorney’s duty of confidentiality is governed by ABA Rule 1.6 and is a general ethics
rule, not an evidentiary rule. This note focuses on the ethics and evidentiary rules
governing the scope of attorney-client privilege.
40 MODEL RULES, supra note 27, r. 1.6.
41 Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108 (2009).
42 See id.
43 David B. Smallman, The Purloined Communications Exception to Inadvertent
Waiver: Internet Publication and Preservation of Attorney-Client Privilege, 32 TORT& INS.
L.J. 715, 721 (1997).
44 Id. (emphasis added).
45 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981). .
46 Robert G. Clyne & Alexander P. Conser, Attorney-Client Privilege and the
Admiralty Practitioner in the Twenty-First Century, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1179, 1202 (2015).
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There are no uniform guidelines or rulings from the
courts such that an attorney or client can predict whether
particular communications will remain protected by privilege if
they are posted on the Internet without the client’s authorization.
Moreover, the lack of guidance from bar associations and courts
means that an attorney determining whether to view hacked files
that are part of constant news coverage, some of which may be
protected by privilege, cannot predict if ethics rule permit him
to view the files. Until courts come up with a consistent rule for
dealing with this increasingly common scenario, attorneys
must work within the already established framework of ethical
rules guiding the use of privileged documents.
A. Burden of Protecting the Attorney-Client Privilege
Attorney-client privilege is established when a client
and attorney exchange communications in the course of
providing legal advice.47 There is a clear mandate for the
holders of privilege to act competently to preserve
confidentiality by appropriately “safeguard[ing] information
relating to representation of a client against inadvertent or
unauthorized disclosure.”48 In Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, Inc. v.
Swiss-Bernina, Inc., the district court articulated the standard
for determining if a party took adequate precautions, finding
that the paramount considerations are: “(1) the effect on
uninhibited consultation between attorney and client of not
allowing the privilege in these circumstances; and (2) the
ability of the parties to the communication to protect against
the disclosures.”49
The second prong provides the grayest area in this
inquiry due to the prevalence of technology in people’s personal
and professional lives. The party invoking privilege has the
burden to show both that it intended the files to be confidential
and that it “took all possible precautions” to keep them
confidential.50 This guidance is key in the age of hacks as it
47 For a detailed discussion of each element needed to establish the privilege,
see Daniel Northrop, Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Information Disclosed to
an Attorney with the Intention that the Attorney Draft a Document to be Released to
Third Parties: Public Policy Calls for at Least the Strictest Application of the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1481, 1485–91 (2009).
48 MODEL RULES, supra note 27, r. 1.6 cmt. 18.
49 Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 260
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (finding that case law, especially in “eavesdropper” cases, reveals that
the relevant rule looks to whether the party invoking privilege intended to keep the
communication confidential).
50 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Arch Mineral Corp., 145 F.R.D. 3, 6
(D.D.C. 1992).
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places the burden to take precautions not on the attorney
viewing the leaked files but on the attorney and client who
seek to protect the files.51 But many ethics rules also place a
burden on the attorneys in receipt of unsolicited files by
requiring them to refrain from viewing the files “if there are
‘obvious indications’ that privileged documents were disclosed.”52
These rules serve to hold accountable both the party claiming
privilege and the party in receipt of unsolicited files. Both
parties must protect the privilege by taking adequate
precautions against breaching the confidentiality of the
communications. But, as discussed in Section III.A, it is
impractical to place such a burden on the “receiving” party in the
event of a hack.
B. Inadvertent Disclosure of Files Subject to Privilege
While attorney-client privilege dates back to the
sixteenth century,53 the advent of email communications has
increasingly forced attorneys into the ethical quandary of “to
view or not to view.” Advances in technology have also greatly
aided attorneys in efficiently receiving and viewing documents
but have also provided a myriad of ways to send confidential
and privileged documents to the wrong recipient. The Federal
Rules of Evidence (Rules of Evidence) provide that an
inadvertent disclosure does not automatically waive the claim
of privilege if:
(1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or
protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the
holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if
applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (b)(5)(B).54
No evidentiary rule provides guidance for attorneys who
receive files sent inadvertently and therefore they must look to
51 There are traditional precautions available to indicate documents are
privileged and thus protecting the claim of privilege, such as clearly marking files
“Attorney-Client Privilege” and limiting distribution of the file to only the necessary
parties. As discussed infra Section III.A, however, these traditional methods are rendered
virtually meaningless after a publicized hack as thousands of citizens and journalists
pour through documents, regardless of whether they are clearly marked as subject to
attorney-client privilege or not.
52 See generally Burke T. Ward et al., Electronic Discovery: Rules for a Digital
Age, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 150 (2012) (“The Advisory Committee . . . notes that
under F.R.C.P. 26(b)(5)(B), a party does not have to review documents as they were
produced to determine whether an inadvertent production occurred, but should review
only to follow up if there are ‘obvious indications’ that privileged documents were
disclosed.”).
53 PAULR.RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENTPRIVILEGE INTHEUNITEDSTATES § 1.1 (1993).
54 FED. R. EV. 502(b).
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other sources to guide their conduct. Attorneys can, however,
look to ethics rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(Federal Rules) for such guidance. Additionally, when an
attorney receives a document or email related to a client’s case
“and knows or reasonably should know that . . . [it] was
inadvertently sent, [the attorney should] promptly notify the
sender.”55 This ABA ethics rule, as explained in its
accompanying formal opinion, covers such situations where an
attorney attaches the wrong file to an email in error and sends
to opposing counsel or where an attorney is mistakenly copied on
emails between a third party and the third party’s attorney.56 In
the discovery phase of litigation, Federal Rule 26 provides
attorneys protection against inadvertent disclosure of privileged
information during large document productions of electronically
stored information (ESI). At the outset of discovery, in addition
to withholding information that is privileged, the Federal Rules
encourage parties to negotiate “quick peek” and “claw back”
arrangements.57 These arrangements allow the producing party
to provide ESI while still preserving a claim of privilege even
after the ESI has been sent to the requesting party.58 The
Supreme Court updated Rule 26 a decade ago in recognition of
the need both for extensive discovery of electronic files and also
the need to mitigate the risk of inadvertent disclosure of
privileged files.59 The rule allows litigants to provide documents
first and invoke privilege later—to claw the privileged document
back from an adversary—confident that a court will not find that
the inadvertent disclosure waived the privilege. This rule serves
to further the goal of broad discovery while also maintaining the
confidentiality of files protected by privilege.
If parties have not negotiated such a “claw back”
agreement, however, the Federal Rules still provide guidance
on how litigants must proceed in the event of an inadvertent
disclosure of privileged documents during discovery. The party
claiming the privilege must notify the receiving party and
55 MODEL RULES, supra note 27, r. 4.4(b) (emphasis added).
56 See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006).
57 N. Thomas Connally & Jon M. Talotta, The New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: What Every Corporate Counsel Should Know and Do 3, ABA CORP.
COUNSEL NEWSL. (Dec. 16, 2006), http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0056/
materials/pp6.pdf [https://perma.cc/MYF6-4EH5].
58 Id.
59 John K. Villa, Clawbacks, Quick Peeks, and Running with Scissors, ACC
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establish the basis for the claim of privilege.60 Upon receipt of
that notification, the receiving party must either return or
destroy the information, refrain from using it in any way, and
may request that the court rule on the claim of privilege.61 The
party claiming the privilege must also preserve the information
until the court makes its determination.62
The Federal Rules and the ABA Ethics Rules serve to
give attorneys guidance on how to proactively address common
inadvertent disclosure situations. The party claiming privilege
is motivated to take adequate precautions against disclosure of
the files and to label files so their privileged status is readily
apparent. The receiving party is obligated to notify and destroy
or return, with the goal of restoring the privileged document to
its original, confidential status. In the age of hacks, however,
receiving attorneys are not faced with the choice of whether to
open an attachment they think was sent to them in error.
Instead, receiving attorneys are faced with the choice of
reading the Washington Post’s coverage of a presidential
election or not. A receiving attorney reading the Washington
Post and subsequently notifying the owner of the privilege of
the disclosure would be a fruitless exercise because the owner
is likely already well aware of the hack due to widespread news
coverage. Moreover, in those scenarios, there is generally no
path back to restoring confidentiality, precisely because of the
news coverage.63 The point of these ethics and procedural
rules—that the mistake of providing an opponent with
privileged information may be avoided or minimized simply by
notifying the other attorney to return to file—cannot and
should not apply to a hack.
C. Unauthorized Disclosure of Files Subject to Privilege
Traditional guidelines from bar associations that govern
an attorney’s obligation are less clear when an attorney
receives an “unauthorized” disclosure of files that might be
protected by privilege. While inadvertent disclosures occur by
mistake, unauthorized disclosures are made purposefully by
third parties who do not have permission to share a file, such
60 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(5)(B).
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 For example, while it is not public exactly how much traffic the Wikileaks
documents received, the Washington Post article reporting on and linking to a legal
memo sent to the Clinton Foundation received over 5200 comments from readers
suggesting at least that many people read the article. Helderman & Hamburger, supra
note 36; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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as disgruntled employees or hackers.64 Most guidelines place
the burden of protecting the confidentiality of the privileged
communication on the receiving attorney. State bar association
ethics rules vary from state-to-state65 and are not on point for the
increasingly relevant and prevalent situation of publicized hacks.
Bar association rules and opinions that govern attorney
conduct when in receipt of potentially stolen documents do not
logically apply to publicized hacks. For example, the D.C. Bar
Association requires an attorney who receives a document that
likely was taken without authorization to
refrain from reviewing and using the document if: 1) its privileged
status is readily apparent on its face; 2) receiving counsel knows that
the document came from someone who was not authorized to disclose
it; and 3) receiving counsel does not have a reasonable basis to
conclude that the opposing party waived the attorney-client privilege
with respect to such document.66
This rule makes sense if an attorney is currently
engaged in litigation and receives files belonging to an adversary
from an anonymous source or a disgruntled employee. In
publicized hacks, however, documents stolen and released on the
Internet are often marked as protected by attorney-client
privilege, making their privileged status readily apparent on
their face. Further, by definition, hackers are never authorized
to disclose a company’s files, and therefore the receiving
attorney cannot conclude the hacked party waived the
attorney-client privilege. Applying the D.C. Bar’s Rule 1.15(b)
to a publicized hack would require an attorney to refrain from
reading widely circulated news reports on a hack. This is yet
another example of how traditional ethics rules are woefully
inept at guiding attorneys through the ethical minefield of
publicized hacks.
64 See, e.g., D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 318 (2002).
65 Compare N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 700 (1998)
(“Lawyer who receives unsolicited communication from former employee of adversary’s
law firm regarding alteration of documents may not communicate further with
employee and should seek judicial guidance as to the use of the unauthorized
communication.”), with D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 318, supra note 64 (“When
counsel in an adversary proceeding receives a privileged document from a client or
other person that may have been stolen or taken without authorization from an
opposing party, Rule 1.15(b) requires the receiving counsel to refrain from reviewing
and using the document if: 1) its privileged status is readily apparent on its face; 2)
receiving counsel knows that the document came from someone who was not
authorized to disclose it; and 3) receiving counsel does not have a reasonable basis to
conclude that the opposing party waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to
such document.”).
66 D.C. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 318, supra note 64.
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The ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility (ABA Committee on Ethics)
provides no guidance on appropriate steps in the event of an
attorney receiving files sent without authorization. In 2011, the
ABA Committee on Ethics explained that Model Rule 4.4(b)
and its notice requirement apply only to inadvertent
disclosures from opposing counsel.67 While the ABA Committee
on Ethics acknowledged that there might be laws that preclude
a receiving attorney from retaining files sent without
authorization, it stated explicitly that the issue was “a matter
of law beyond the scope of Rule 4.4(b).”68 This is the exact
scenario an attorney is faced with in the event of a publicized
hack, and the ABA Committee on Ethics dodged providing
attorneys with guidance on the issue. Instead, it noted that it
may still be in the lawyer’s “best interest to give notice [to
opposing counsel] and obtain a judicial ruling as to the
admissibility of the . . . attorney-client communications before
attempting to use them, and if possible, before the . . . lawyer
reviews them.”69
In short, the ABA Committee on Ethics suggests that
attorneys faced with a now common ethical dilemma—reading
a Washington Post article quoting and linking directly to a
legal memo from the Clinton Foundation70—head to the courts
for a judicial ruling on the issue. While perhaps an attorney
already engaged in litigation may efficiently seek a judicial
ruling on situations involving privileged documents,71
requesting that attorneys refrain from reading certain news
articles until a court may rule is not practical.
A practical and predictable rule is sorely needed in this
area, for attorneys risk serious consequences if a court finds
that they improperly reviewed files protected by attorney-client
privilege. In Castellano v. Winthrop, a mother who was
engaged in ongoing litigation with the father of her children
67 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011)
(“[T]his Committee found that Rule 4.4(b) does not obligate a lawyer to notify a lawyer
to notify opposing counsel that the lawyer has received privileged or otherwise
confidential materials of the adverse party from someone who was not authorized to
provide the materials, if the materials were not provided as ‘the result of the sender’s
inadvertence.’” (emphasis added) (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 06-442 (2006))).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
71 See Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The result here
does not set up an impractical or insurmountable hurdle for counsel facing an ethical
dilemma concerning privileged documents. The path to ethical resolution is simple:
when in doubt, ask the court.”).
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illegally obtained his flash drive, which contained thousands of
documents.72 The mother then retained a law firm, whose
attorneys then spent over one hundred hours reviewing the
files on the flash drive, some of which were subject to attorney-
client privilege.73 Upon discovering that the firm was going
through the flash drive, the father’s counsel filed an emergency
petition to order the return of the flash drive and request the
dismissal of the firm from the action.74
The trial court ordered a seal of the information from
the flash drive placed in the court file.75 The court further
indemnified the father against any damages he might suffer
from the improper use of the files contained on his flash drive.76
The trial court also disqualified the firm from the action because
it obtained “an informational advantage.”77 In upholding the
order, the Court of Appeals for Florida cited the Florida Bar
Commission on Professional Ethics covering what an attorney
must do when he receives confidential files he knows or should
know were obtained illegally.78 This case illustrates the
quandary facing attorneys after a publicized hack of an
adversary: read news articles reporting on the contents of your
opponent’s privileged files at the risk of ultimately being
disqualified from your litigation.
D. Waiver of Privilege
Even if a document or communication is protected by
attorney-client privilege, a court may determine that the
privilege has been “waived.” A finding of express or implied
waiver precludes a client from refusing to disclose files by
invoking the privilege.
Though express waiver of privilege is rare,79 it occurs when:
[A] party discloses privileged information to a third party who is not
bound by the privilege, or otherwise shows disregard for the
privilege by making the information public. Disclosures that effect
an express waiver are typically within the full control of the party
holding the privilege.80
72 Castellano v. Winthrop, 27 So. 3d 134, 135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 136.
76 Id.
77 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
78 Id. at 137.
79 RICE, supra note 53, § 9.24.
80 Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 2003).
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A court is unlikely to find an express waiver of privilege
in the case of a hack because the documents that hackers
release are no longer “within the full control of the party holding
the privilege.”81 Moreover, an express waiver of privilege is
unlikely to occur unless the corporation or individual states that
he is waiving privilege in order to address allegations or
accusations about contents of the files in question.82 When
determining whether files released and widely disseminated by
hackers are still protected by privilege, courts should consider
whether the party claiming privilege utilized sufficient
precautions against a hack such that the privilege is not
implicitly waived.
While privilege is deemed waived if a client purposefully
discloses a file protected by privilege, there is no consensus on
whether the attorney-client privilege is automatically waived
by an inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure.83 Under some
circumstances, the simple failure to keep a file confidential—
regardless of the circumstances of its disclosure—is deemed a
waiver of the privilege.84 While other courts look to whether
disclosure of the file was unintentional or inadvertent before
determining whether the party waived privilege,85 many courts
do not bother with that distinction. In an attempt to deter the
use of stolen documents, those courts have stated there is no
waiver of privilege if privileged communications are disclosed
by a third party with no authorization.86
Courts have examined scenarios in which parties have
left privileged documents in locations that were obviously
vulnerable to third party access and have found an implicit
waiver of attorney-client privilege.87 A court might consider public
81 Id.
82 But see infra notes 99–110 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
a party’s conduct after a hack may risk a court finding an express waiver due to the
disclosure of the contents of a legal memo.
83 Gloria A. Kristopek, To Peek or Not to Peek: Inadvertent or Unsolicited
Disclosure of Documents to Opposing Counsel, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 643, 653 (1999).
84 See, e.g., Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D.
254, 257 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
85 See, e.g., id.
86 Smallman, supra note 43, at 728 (“These rulings appropriately protect
clients’ expectations of confidentiality when communicating with their attorneys,
discourage the theft of privileged material, and preserve the integrity of the judicial
process, particularly if there is a suspicion that the theft was undertaken either at the
direction of or with the encouragement of a litigation adversary.”).
87 The scenarios center around what sort of access third-parties have to the
privileged documents:
When the client leaves privileged documents in a place where third parties
have access to them, courts have held that their privilege status is destroyed.
Thus, storing documents in a place accessible to third parties without taking
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comments by Sony’s Executive Director of Information that it was
a “valid business decision to accept the risk of a security breach”88
in deciding whether Sony’s knowing acceptance of risk results in a
waiver of the attorney-client privilege for any legal memos that
were hacked and posted on the Internet. Thus, as discussed in
Section III.A, concrete and substantial technological protections
against cybersecurity breaches must be at the top of every
company’s list of priorities, especially given how frequent and
publicized these hacks have become.89
When it was first clear that email was not a fad, courts
and legal commentators alike acknowledged “that technological
advancements exist against which ‘no easily available
protection exists.’”90 That argument is now outdated.91 Email and
intranet use are no longer a novelty in the workplace and
any measures to maintain their confidentiality waives the privilege.
Similarly, privilege is waived when clients leave papers in a public hallway
for delivery to the attorney or on a table in a hotel room occupied by other
people. Waiver also results when documents are kept in files that are
routinely viewed by third parties, including potentially when email files are
kept on a monitored server. Additionally, waiver has been found where
electronic storage devices containing privileged documents are sold or
conveyed to a third party without removing the documents. Moreover, a
client’s disposal of privileged documents into a waste paper basket that was
then emptied into a dumpster, from which the documents were salvaged by a
third party, also destroyed the privilege.
RICE, supra note 53, § 9.25 (footnotes omitted).
88 Andrea Peterson, Why It’s So Hard to Calculate the Cost of the Sony
Pictures Hack, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2014/12/05/why-its-so-hard-to-calculate-the-cost-of-the-sony-pictures-hack/
?utm_term=.548c098061a8 [https://perma.cc/SK7F-J5FJ].
89 A leading treatise of attorney-client privilege notes that new technologies
pose new questions about what steps are deemed “reasonable” enough to protect
privileged files:
Recent issues in cybersecurity have potentially called into question what
steps are reasonably required to prevent third parties from accessing
privileged communications that are stored in a virtual environment. For
example, recent reports associated with Edward Snowden, who leaked
thousands of classified documents, detail government monitoring of
privileged electronic communications between law firms and clients. Similar
reports have uncovered widespread government monitoring of certain private
email accounts. The courts have not yet weighed in on what effect, if any, this
should have in the privilege realm, although any heightened standard for
ensuring confidentiality could inhibit the flow of communication between
lawyer and client, diminishing the benefit of the privilege.
RICE, supra note 53, § 9.25 (footnotes omitted).
90 Smallman, supra note 43, at 725.
91 See Lois D. Mermelstein, Ethics Update: Lawyers Must Keep Up with
Technology Too, BUS. LAW TODAY, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2013/03/
keeping_current.html [https://perma.cc/P4CC-3PFN]; 14 States Now Require Lawyers to
Keep Up with New Technology, ANAQUA (May 7, 2015), http://www.anaqua.com/learn/
anaqua-perspectives/14-states-now-require-lawyers-keep-new-technology [https://
perma.cc/3FUA-ER4D].
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password protection alone is woefully insufficient security
against hackers.92 As more of these breaches happen and affect
litigation, courts must look at precautions taken in determining
if a party made a good faith attempt to protect against a hack.
II. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN ACTION
A. Traditional Application
When litigants seek judicial rulings on the validity of a
claim of privilege, courts consider the factors that led to the
document’s disclosure as well as any indications that the party
claiming privilege waived the claim. As discussed in Part I,
courts determine the validity of a claim with the goal of
encouraging candid conversations between a client and his
attorney. If a document has been disclosed, inadvertently or
without authorization, courts can attempt to repair the damage
to the document’s confidential status in several ways, primarily
through restricting the use of the document at trial.93
The remedy of restricting the use of a privileged
document in a court proceeding serves to bolster a client’s
confidence—both a client engaged in litigation and a client
communicating with an attorney for the first time—in the
confidentiality of attorney-client communications. The remedy
does this by ensuring that if a communication is revealed to an
adversary, the court may properly stop the adversary from
admitting the files into evidence. But first, the party claiming
privilege must demonstrate that he did not waive the privilege.
A court will determine whether or not the party
invoking privilege took proper precautions against disclosure of
the document. In Carda v. E.H. Oftedal & Sons, the district
court evaluated a party’s claim of privilege when the plaintiff
moved to exclude from admission as evidence a letter that was
accidentally produced during discovery.94 The plaintiff had
provided his adversary a CD with files as part of discovery,
92 “[I]n 2016 it now appears unreasonable to expect that simply utilizing a
password provides any practical protection.” United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d
585, 619 (E.D. Va. 2016) (citing Caitlin Dewey, It’s Been Six Months Since the Ashley
Madison Hack. Has Anything Changed?, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/01/15/its-been-six-months-since-the-
ashley-madison-hack-has-anything-changed/ [https://perma.cc/U2KK-CSRJ].
93 Smallman, supra note 43, at 728. A court can deem documents
inadmissible, order that an attorney cannot question a party from whom the document
was stolen about the document, and generally prohibit the use of the document or its
contents in the litigation. Id.
94 Carda v. E.H. Oftedal & Sons, CIV. 04-5036-KES, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26368, at *4 (D.S.D. Apr. 28, 2005).
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some of which he argued were sent inadvertently and should be
excluded as evidence because they were protected by attorney-
client privilege.95 The court denied the motion to exclude a
letter the plaintiff sent to his attorney, finding that the party
waived the privilege because “carelessness with privileged
material [is treated] as indication of waiver.”96 The court found
that a cursory review of file names on the CD could have
“easily” prevented the disclosure.97
Beyond adequate security precautions, courts also look
to the actions of the parties claiming privilege after documents
are released into the public domain. In Dukes v. Wal-Mart
Stores, an unnamed source leaked a copy of a memo written by
the law firm Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP to the New
York Times.98 The New York Times did not publish the Akin
Gump memo but did “report several findings contained in the
Memo” in articles published both online and in print versions of
the newspaper.99 The article included comments from a Wal-
Mart spokesperson who was quoted “as having responded that
the company considered the Memo ‘confidential and
privileged.’”100 Wal-Mart, Akin Gump’s client and the defendant
in the lawsuit, alerted the plaintiffs that the New York Times
was going to report on the memo and explained that it still
maintained its claim that privilege protected the file and the
disclosure of the memo was not authorized.101
Eight months after the article was reported by the news,
plaintiff ’s counsel received an envelope with no return address.102
Inside the envelope was a document on Akin Gump letterhead
that was marked “PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL . . . DO
NOT REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF
LESTER C. NAIL.”103 The receiving attorney suspected that it
was the leaked document, did not read it, and informed
95 Id.
96 Id. at *10 (quoting Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1484 (8th Cir. 1996)).
97 Id. at *9–10.
98 Dukes, v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 01-cv-2252 CRB (JSC), 2013 WL
1282892, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013).
99 Id. at *1; see Steven Greenhouse, Report Warned Wal-Mart of Risks Before
Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/04/business/
04lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/72AH-2JLR]. This is in contrast to the Clinton
memorandum, discussed supra note 37, which was posted in its entirety by the
Washington Post and the Daily Caller.
100 Dukes, 2013 WL 1282892 at *2. As discussed infra Section III.A, Wal-
Mart’s comment to the newspaper should be considered as an attempt to still protect
the privilege of the document and thus the court should not find any explicit waiver of
privilege.
101 Dukes, 2013 WL 1282892 at *2.
102 Id.
103 Id. at *3.
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defendant’s counsel of his receipt of the document.104 As the
ABA suggests in this situation,105 the parties went to court to
decide whether or not plaintiffs could keep and use the memo
“however they [saw] fit.”106
The court evaluated the precautions taken by Wal-Mart
before the leak of the memo to the New York Times107 and held
that the disclosure of the memo to the newspaper did not
automatically waive the document’s privileged status.108 The
court also rejected plaintiff ’s argument that Wal-Mart’s public
comments on the memo, which were quoted in the article,
destroyed the privilege because the comments were made
“extrajudicially and without prejudice to the opposing party,
[and thus] there exists no reason in logic or equity to broaden
the waiver beyond those matters actually revealed.”109 The
court ultimately ruled that the memo was still protected by the
attorney-client privilege because Wal-Mart took reasonable
precautions to keep the memo confidential and its comments
after the leak did not constitute a waiver.110
In contrast to Dukes, where there were only reports of
the leaked memo’s contents in the news, courts have considered
whether privileged documents were widely available to the
public in its evaluation of an attorney-client privilege claim.
For example, in Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., USA
Funds filed a motion to strike certain paragraphs and exhibits
from the opposing party’s pleadings.111 The information in the
pleadings came from documents that were improperly disclosed
in a wholly unrelated litigation and subsequently uploaded to
Wikileaks.112 Though uploaded to Wikileaks in violation of a
court order in the unrelated litigation, the plaintiff obtained
the documents legally from a publicly available online source,
which had hosted the documents in question for more than five
104 Id. at *2–3.
105 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006).
106 Dukes, 2013 WL 1282892 at *8.
107 The Court noted the all-caps lettering designating the memo confidential
and privileged, the limited number of copies available of the memo (five total), and the
fact that each copy was individually numbered on the cover. Id. at *3.
108 Id. at *6.
109 Id. at *8 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d
94, 103 (2d Cir. 1987)).
110 Id. at *3, 6. This situation is distinguishable from the more recent hacks,
as discussed infra Part III.
111 Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-00575-TWP, 2014
WL 1048807, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 14, 2014), rev’d and remanded, 799 F.3d 633 (7th
Cir. 2015), reh’g denied, 807 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2015), and cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1607,
195 L. Ed. 2d 241 (2016).
112 Id. at *3–4.
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years.113 The court noted its inability to limit access to the
publicly available documents, finding Ms. Bible part of “the
‘constantly expanding universe’ of people who would have
access to the documents online as a result of the original
breach of the protective order.”114 The court further noted that
it did not have effective power to limit the distribution of such
publicly available files.115
In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Regents of the
University of California, the court justified finding the privilege
was extinguished and any court order to require the return of
the files inappropriate, because “it is simply too late . . . [t]he
genie is out of the bottle. The documents are out.”116 Even
though a third party stole the privileged documents, the court
found that the documents had become part of the public domain
and any attempt to order the documents returned to Brown &
Williamson would be futile.117 Both United Student Aid Funds
and Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. demonstrate a trend of
courts looking to the “futility” of precluding attorneys from
using privileged documents in litigation once the documents
have been widely disseminated or reported on despite the
privileged status.
B. In re Ashley Madison
In 2016, a court heard a case arising directly out of a
publicized hack. Initially, the group responsible for the Ashley
Madison hack, Impact Team, released just a small portion of
the data it had hacked from the dating website.118 Impact Team
did so, they said in a statement, in an effort to blackmail Avid
Life Media, the owner of Ashley Madison.119 As the motive for
the hack, the group cited Ashley Madison’s policy of charging
users a fee to scrub their accounts from the site without
actually deleting any accounts.120 When Avid did not shut down
the site, Impact Team released almost ten gigabytes of
compressed data, basically every document stored on Avid’s
113 Id.
114 Id. at *4.
115 Id.
116 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No.
967298, at *4 (May 25, 1995).
117 Id.
118 Victor, supra note 3.
119 Id. There was speculation that North Korea hacked Sony out of revenge for
the release of The Interview. Biddle, supra note 2.
120 Grandoni, supra note 15.
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servers.121 In addition to individual user data, researchers also
found “huge numbers of internal documents, memos, org charts,
contracts, sales techniques, and more.”122
Impact Team released an unapologetic message to the
Ashley Madison users whose identities it revealed online: “Find
yourself in here? . . . It was [Avid] that failed you and lied to
you. Prosecute them and claim damages. Then move on with
your life. Learn your lesson and make amends. Embarrassing
now, but you’ll get over it.”123
A group of users took the advice and sued Avid in
federal court.124 Despite the plaintiffs’ assurance that they
would not use “any of the original documents leaked in the data
breach,” Avid moved to have the court preclude plaintiffs’ use of
“news articles discussing, and in some cases, quoting those
documents.”125 The court granted Avid’s motion, finding that
“the fact that the content of some of Avid’s internal
documents . . . has been to some extent placed on the internet
and reported in news articles does not change the nature of the
documents . . . [t]hey remain stolen documents.”126 The court
was not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ argument that they would
not use the original documents marked as protected by
attorney-client privilege or that documents were widely
available online.127
This ruling provides broad protection for a company who
finds itself the victim of a hack, but it directly contravenes the
goal of broad file disclosure during litigation and candid
conversation between attorneys and clients. The ruling limits
the ability of litigants to use information that was widely
disseminated and discussed nationally, at the expense of their
case, without actually providing any deterrent to hackers.
121 Tim Schiesser, Data from Ashley Madison Hack Released in Massive 10 GB
Dump, TECHSPOT (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.techspot.com/news/61808-data-ashley-
madison-hack-released-massive-10-gb.html [https://perma.cc/B28J-53N7].
122 Dan Goodin, Ashley Madison Hack Is Not Only Real, It’s Worse than We
Thought, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 19, 2015), http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/ashley-
madison-hack-is-not-only-real-its-worse-than-we-thought/ [https://perma.cc/3NNA-TR94].
123 Bennett, supra note 3.
124 In re Ashley Madison Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. MDL No.
2669, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57619 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2016).
125 Id. at *9.
126 Id. at *19. The fact that the documents were stolen was the most important
factor to the court, not the documents’ dissemination online or any document’s
privileged status. Id. at *19–20.
127 Id. at *19.
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III. EVALUATING PRIVILEGE IN THE AGE OFHACKERS
Predictability and practicality must always be key
considerations of courts in determining whether a document
continues to be protected by attorney-client privilege after a
publicized hack. People should be extremely wary of what they
include in electronic communications, knowing that they may
one day be part of a subpoena or, worse, released on the
Internet by vindictive hackers.128 That companies are hacked is
now predictable, but how courts evaluate a claim of privilege
after the file has been released to the public by a hacker is
anything but. While attorneys may be subject to greater ethical
obligations than non-attorneys,129 courts must apply the
attorney-client privilege protection practically after a hack.
As discussed in Part I, the evidentiary rule of attorney-
client privilege exists to encourage candid discussions between
a client and his attorney130 but is in tension with the broad
disclosure of files relevant to litigation.131 A court that restricts
the use of documents that have been the topic of national news
coverage serves neither the policy of broad disclosure during
litigation nor the encouragement of candid discussions between
clients and attorneys.132 Hackers are destroying confidence that
any communication may remain confidential, let alone a
privileged communication. Indeed law firms are specifically
targeted because of the sensitive information they hold.133
Moreover, for the privilege to encourage candid conversations,
courts’ application of the privilege “must be clear and
128 See Ken Broda-Bahm, Dance Like No One Is Watching; Email Like It May
One Day Be Read Aloud in a Deposition, PERSUASIVE LITIGATOR (July 28, 2016),
http://www.persuasivelitigator.com/2016/07/dance-like-no-one-is-watching-email-like-it-
may-one-day-be-read-aloud-in-a-deposition.html [https://perma.cc/6ZRR-FWQJ]. In 2016
alone, hackers released emails from the Democratic National Committee, political
operative Donna Brazile, and former Secretary of State Colin Powell. Id.; Dylan Byers,
Donna Brazile Out at CNN Amid Leaks to Clinton Campaign, CNNMONEY (Oct. 31, 2016),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/10/31/media/donna-brazile-cnn-resignation/ [https://perma.cc/
TDW8-7HD7]; The Emails in Which Colin Powell Slams Hillary Clinton and Donald
Trump, CBS NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/media/5-emails-in-which-colin-powell-
slammed-hillary-clinton/ [https://perma.cc/C9SY-MVZE] (last updated Sept. 14, 2016).
129 See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1073–74 (1991).
130 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
131 Smallman, supra note 43, at 721 and accompanying text.
132 See supra Part I for a full discussion of these policies.
133 See also Sara Randazzo & Dave Michaels, U.S. Charges Three Chinese
Traders with Hacking Law Firms, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/u-s-charges-three-chinese-traders-with-hacking-law-firms-1482862000
[https://perma.cc/9FA2-G99G] (Prosecutors stated that five law firms were targeted by
hackers 100,000 times between March and September 2015.).
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consistent.”134 Based on the current ethics rules and opinions,
discussed in Part I, and the current body of case law, discussed in
Part II, it is anything but clear how a court would rule on an
attorney viewing a hacked file or admitting it into evidence.
This critical predictability is currently missing in the age of
hacking and must be addressed by the courts while furthering
the goals of litigation and attorney-client privilege.
Courts should look to whether the party claiming
privilege had adequate cybersecurity to prevent against hacks
and whether the party’s actions after the hack indicate an
implicit waiver. Even if the party had adequate cybersecurity
and did not implicitly waive privilege after the hack, courts
should still place the burden on that party to demonstrate that
the file remains confidential, despite the hack. Confidentiality
is a key component of the attorney-client privilege and if a file
becomes a topic of national conversation, permitting a party
who was hacked to invoke privilege would be futile and go
against the court’s interest in broad disclosure of information
during litigation.
A. Shifting the Burden of Protecting Privileged Files in the
Age of Hackers
Ethics rules should not place the burden on attorneys—
who had no involvement in illegal activity and who merely visit
a news organization’s website—to protect the attorney-client
privilege of an opposing party after a publicized hack. As
discussed in Sections I.B and C, current ethics rules place the
burden on attorneys in receipt of unsolicited files to act to
134 RICE, supra note 53, at § 2.3; see also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599
F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979) (“[W]e agree with the majority view that the incentive to
confide is at least partially dependent upon the client’s ability to predict that the
communication will be held in confidence.”); Berg Elecs., Inc. v. Molex, Inc., 875 F.
Supp. 261, 262 (D. Del. 1995) (“If we intend to serve the interests of justice by
encouraging clients to consult with counsel free from the apprehension of disclosure,
then courts must work to apply the privilege in ways that are predictable and
certain. . . . An uncertain privilege is a privilege that is little better than no privilege at
all.” (internal citation omitted)). But see Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100,
109–10 (2009) (The Supreme Court denied a request for an immediate appeal to an
order compelling the disclosure of information which the appellant claimed was
protected by privilege. In denying the claim, the Court said that postponing an
appellate review of the order “does not meaningfully reduce the ex ante incentives for
full and frank consultations between clients and counsel.” Because, among other
reasons, “clients and counsel are unlikely to focus on the remote prospect of an
erroneous disclosure order, let alone on the timing of a possible appeal.” While the
Court may have had sound reasoning in applying its rules on interlocutory appeals, it
did not further the purpose of privilege’s protection of candid conversations between
attorneys and clients for the decision does not promote predictability on how courts
evaluate claims of privilege.).
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protect the confidentially of the files protected by privilege. The
ethics rules require attorneys who “know[ ] or reasonably
should know that” the files were sent inadvertently or without
authorization to not read the files and to notify the sender.135
Ethics rules guiding attorneys in receipt of files they suspect
might be stolen place an even greater burden on the receiving
attorney. While ethics rules vary depending on the state and
scenario, many require attorneys in receipt of privileged files
they reasonably believe were sent without authorization to
notify opposing counsel, refrain from reading, and even obtain
a judicial ruling on what further actions to take.136 These ethics
rules are not practical where the confidentiality of a privileged
document no longer exists as a result of a hack dominating
news cycles. Bar associations should revise ethics rules to
reflect this new scenario.
An ethics rule proscribing attorneys from visiting the
hacker’s website directly to view potentially privileged files
would permit attorneys to read news coverage of the files while
at the same time limit them from combing through the millions
of illegally obtained files of a potential adversary.137 Such a rule
recognizes that once a hack occurs, thousands of files may be
available to the public but attorneys must still adhere to
ethical rules that govern the legal profession.
Certainly, courts may rightly be concerned that allowing
attorneys to look through illegally obtained files just because
they are posted online might encourage more hacks of
confidential information.138 Just as the Supreme Court in
Bartnicki v. Vopper found it unacceptable to punish a news
organization for publishing illegally obtained documents, so too
should ethics rules and court rulings acknowledge that
punishing attorneys who were not involved in the illegal act to
be unacceptable. In Bartnicki, the Court acknowledged that
criminalizing third parties that publish illegally obtained
documents might minimize the harm of the illegal act but
135 See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
136 See supra Section I.C.
137 For example, it would prevent attorneys acting on behalf of the U.S.
government from seeking evidence of tax evasion from the illegally hacked Panama
Papers instead of through its normal investigation procedures. In 2016, the U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York opened a criminal investigation into
tax evasion and reached out to the media companies in possession of the Panama
Papers, the inference being his office wanted to obtain files from the Panama Papers to
use in the investigation. Rupert Neate, Panama Papers: US Launches Criminal Inquiry
into Tax Avoidance Claims, GUARDIAN (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2016/apr/19/panama-papers-us-justice-department-investigation-tax-avoidance
[https://perma.cc/KQ9R-8B6W].
138 See supra Section II.B.
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ultimately found that the means of minimization were not
acceptable.139 The Court noted that “[t]he normal method of
deterring unlawful conduct is to impose an appropriate
punishment on the person who engages in it.”140 Proscribing
attorneys from visiting the illegal source of files but permitting
them to view news reports on the files, adds an additional layer
of separation between the attorney and the illegal act. Further,
such a rule would also recognize the impracticability of
requiring attorneys to refrain from viewing files protected by
privilege despite widespread dissemination and news coverage
of such files.
There are additional steps that lawyers, individuals,
and corporations alike should take before and after a hack to
protect both confidential and privileged documents. In the
context of determining whether or not a file may be admitted
into evidence despite a claim of privilege, courts should place
the burden on victims of such hacks to demonstrate that they
took adequate precautions, suitable to the digital age, to
protect against any waiver of attorney-client privilege.
Traditional methods of marking a document as confidential
and limiting its distribution are insufficient to protect attorney-
client privilege in the twenty-first century. Attorneys
specifically must also keep abreast of the benefits and risks of
technology they use in their practice.141
It is inexcusable for attorneys and clients not to update
their methods for protecting privilege to meet twenty-first
century realities. New technologies and hackers, as a former
president of the ABA stated, mean that “a single click by one
employee, one lawyer in your office, can mean the difference
between being hacked and staying secure. That should make
all [attorneys] nervous.”142 Just as courts have found that
leaving a physical file unguarded may lead to a waiver of
privilege, so too should courts consider whether inadequate
cybersecurity might constitute a waiver.143 Courts should find
139 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001).
140 Id.
141 American Bar Association Commission on Ethics 20/20 issued a new
comment to Rule 1.1, requiring lawyers to keep abreast of the benefits and risks of
technology they use in their practices. MODEL RULES, supra note 27, r. 1.1 cmt 8 (“To
maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in
the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant
technology . . . .”).
142 Silkenat, supra note 26, at 459.
143 See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 88 (“Sony Pictures’ internal approach to
security may have contributed to the devastating nature of the attack.”); Matt Burgess
& James Temperton, The Security Flaws at the Heart of the Panama Papers, WIRED
(Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/panama-papers-mossack-fonseca-website-
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that cybersecurity that fails to adapt and meet the increased
risk of hacks results in an implicit waiver of privilege.
There is no shortage of online resources outlining best
practices for maintaining the security of a company’s files.144
Techniques for ensuring that documents protected by privilege
remain confidential may include encryption of files and active
monitoring of file systems.145 Since technology evolves and
sophisticated hackers find ways around cybersecurity, attorneys
and clients must continue to examine and update the security
systems they have in place.146 Parties should be able to
demonstrate to courts their policies for and assessment of
cybersecurity as well as user training and education.147
In evaluating a claim of privilege after a hack, courts
should consider whether the cybersecurity practices taken
before a hack were sufficient to reasonably protect against a
hack of privileged files. To win a claim of privilege after a hack,
the party claiming the privilege should not have to
demonstrate that they went above and beyond in their security
measures—though, of course, for a variety of other compelling
reasons they may want to.148 Rather the party should
demonstrate that they did the minimum to protect their
documents. As is standard practice for physical files, they need
not show that they had a security guard stationed outside of
file cabinets, just that they were not careless.
Additionally, courts should look to actions taken after a
hack when evaluating whether a party has implicitly waived
privilege. Though it may be a fruitless endeavor, after a hack,
attorneys should still send requests to websites and news
security-problems [https://perma.cc/GPP6-HBLR] (“The front-end computer systems of
Mossack Fonseca are outdated and riddled with security flaws, analysis has
revealed.”).
144 See generally CONG. SMALL BUSINESS COMM., CAREFUL CONNECTIONS:
BUILDING SECURITY IN THE INTERNET OF THINGS, https://smallbusiness.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/2_internet_of_things.pdf [https://perma.cc/P94E-NMQM]; JILL RHODES &
VINCENT I. POLLEY, THE ABA CYBERSECURITY HANDBOOK: A RESOURCE FOR ATTORNEYS,
LAW FIRMS, AND BUSINESS PROFESSIONALS (2013). It is worth noting as well that, while
technology cannot be avoided in twenty-first century business, some executives avoid
using email for important conversations out of fear of a hack. Oran, supra note 14.
145 Silkenat, supra note 26, at 457–58.
146 Id. at 460.
147 See, e.g., id at 458. (“Concrete steps must be taken by law firms moving
forward if they are to practice law in this age of hackers and surveillance. Talking a
good game is not good enough anymore.”).
148 The majority of small businesses go out of business following a hack. Ted
Knutson, New Cybersecurity Aids for Small Businesses Posted Online by Congress, FIN.
ADVISOR (Mar. 10, 2017), http://www.fa-mag.com/news/new-cybersecurity-aids-for-small-
businesses-posted-online-by-congress-31774.html?section=43. The average cost of a
single data breach was $6.53 million in 2014. Jeff Kosseff, The Cybersecurity Privilege,
12 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 265, 266 (2016).
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organizations requesting that they take down any documents
that are protected by privilege. As the First Amendment
protects the publishing of newsworthy documents,149 it is highly
unlikely that a news organization would respond positively to
such a request. But the attorney could use this post-hack action
to demonstrate to the court that the party did not waive
privilege, expressly or implicitly. For example, in response to
news coverage of the hack, Sony’s attorneys sent a letter to the
major news sources in possession of Sony’s stolen files noting
that some of the hacked documents are protected by attorney-
client privilege.150 While commentators noted that this action
was likely in vain because of First Amendment protection, the
action clearly demonstrated Sony’s intent to maintain the files’
protected status.151
Conversely, a client or attorney publicly commenting on
the contents of privileged documents could risk a court finding
the party disclosed the contents of the document and thus
waived the privilege.152 A court could interpret a public
comment as a voluntary waiver to a third party, thus
destroying the file’s privilege protection.153 This provides few
good choices for a company wanting to both appropriately deal
with the public relations nightmare of a hack and also avoid
waiving privilege on certain documents that might be relevant
to current or future litigation.154 For example, in the aftermath
of the Wikileaks release of a legal memo, the company that
issued the memo, Teneo,155 publicly commented that “as the
memo demonstrates, Teneo worked to encourage clients, where
appropriate, to support the Clinton Foundation because of the
good work that it does around the world.”156 If an attorney were
149 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001).




152 But see Dukes v. Walmart, No. 01-cv-2252 CRB (JSC), 2013 WL 1282892,
at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (example of a post-leak statement that a court found
did not waive privilege).
153 See generally In reQwest Commc’ns Intern. Inc., 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006).
154 Dukes, 2013 WL 1282892 at *1, 8–9 (Wal-Mart was faced with responding
publicly about a memo in which its law firm had warned of a sex discrimination suit,
while also defending against that very type of suit.). But see Smith v. Armour Pharm.
Co., 838 F. Supp. 1573, 1577 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (“In the face of public disclosure, Cutter
should not be gagged for fear of waiving the privilege that would otherwise apply to the
Memorandum.”).
155 Teneo is a corporate consulting firm. Helderman &Hamburger, supra note 36.
156 Id. But the company cofounder as well as the spokesperson for the Clinton
Foundation declined to comment. Id. Glen Caplin, Hillary Clinton’s campaign spokesman,
declined to comment but generally called the material “hacked by the Russian government
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to try to admit into evidence this widely available memo in a
suit against the Clinton Foundation, a court would have to
determine whether Teneo’s comments constitute a disclosure of
the communication contained in the memo. That at least one
national newspaper made the full text of the memo available
on its website poses a different problem: the court would also
have to look past the document’s perfunctory attorney-client
privilege label and consider the futility of trying to restore the
memo’s confidentiality.
B. Burden of Establishing Confidentiality
Even if the party claiming privilege employed adequate
cybersecurity and its post-hack actions demonstrate no waiver
of privilege, courts should still require the hacked party to
establish that the file sought to be admitted remains
confidential. For if a document is widely disseminated and a
topic of national conversation, it would be futile to tell an
opposing attorney not to view or use it in litigation. The
opposing attorney is likely to know the contents of the hacked
file and will still be able to use the knowledge to his
advantage.157 Hackers are destroying the confidence that “full
and frank” discussions with an attorney—let alone with
personal contacts through email—will remain confidential.
Courts should find that permitting a party to refuse to produce
files by invoking attorney-client privilege is a futile attempt to
protect full and frank conversations between clients and
attorneys. After a hack, the cat is out of the bag on the contents
of any candid conversations. If a court finds that a file no
longer remains confidential and the privileged waived, the
party who lost on the claim of privilege may still rely on other
Rules of Evidence to exclude the document.
Courts apply a “futility” principle in other contexts, such
as trade secrets and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
requests. In trade secret cases courts put the burden on
plaintiffs to show “that the trade secret remains a secret
despite the Internet posting.”158 One court concluded that, even
and weaponized by WikiLeaks,” which at the very least did not dispute the authenticity
of the memo. Id.
157 Unlike Castellano v. Winthrop, an attorney cannot avoid documents that
are part of a national conversation and therefore should not be penalized in such an
extreme way as disqualification as counsel. Castellano v. Winthrop, 27 So. 3d 134, 136
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). For examples of courts finding that the public dissemination
of files extinguished the claim of privilege, see supra notes 110–116.
158 DVD Copy Control Ass’n., Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 27 (Cal. 2003)
(emphasis added).
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though only accessible to the public for a limited time, “once
that trade secret has been released into the public domain there
is no retrieving it.”159 That whoever posted the trade secret
online did so illegally is irrelevant to the court’s inquiry.160 A
court only looks to whether the trade secret is, in fact, still
secret.161 In cases concerning government secrets, citizens may
request access to government documents through a FOIA
request.162 Nine enumerated exemptions, however, grant the
government the ability to refuse to confirm or deny the
existence of documents, mostly in the context of national
security.163 Even if an agency properly invokes a statutory
exemption, a court may still find that the agency waived the
exemptions “by officially acknowledging the existence of
records” or that the information requested is already public due
to another “documented disclosure.”164 Once a document is
officially acknowledged, a court can then deem the government
to have waived its claim to a FOIA exemption and compel the
agency to disclose the requested document.165
As in trade secret and FOIA cases, courts should place
the burden on a party claiming a file is privileged to
demonstrate that the file remains confidential, despite a
publicized hack. For example, if a party demonstrates that the
privileged file was posted on an obscure website with very little
traffic, detected, and removed quickly, the privileged status
would not be waived. If the party cannot demonstrate that the
file remained confidential, then the court should deem that the
privilege is extinguished under a futility principle. This finding
159 Religious Tech Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 923 F. Supp. 1231,
1256 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (emphasis added).
160 Id.
161 Id. (“While the court is persuaded by the Church’s evidence that those who
made the original postings likely gained the information through improper
means . . . this does not negate the finding that, once posted, the works lost their
secrecy.”); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(“Once a trade secret is posted on the Internet, it is effectively part of the public
domain, impossible to retrieve. Although the person who originally posted a trade
secret on the Internet may be liable for trade secret misappropriation, the party who
merely down loads Internet information cannot be liable for misappropriation because
there is no misconduct involved in interacting with the Internet.”).
162 Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (2007) (The act mandates “broad disclosure
of government records to the public, [but is] subject to nine enumerated exemptions.”).
163 Id.
164 Courts evaluate the following factors in determining whether the
government waived its exception. “First, the information requested must be as specific
as the information previously released. Second, the information requested must match
the information previously disclosed . . . . Third, . . . the information requested must
already have been made public through an official and documented disclosure.” Id. at
378 (quoting Fitzgibbon v. C.I.A., 911 F.2d 755, 765 (2d Cir. 1990)).
165 Id.
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would recognize the reality that once a document has been
posted online and reported on extensively, there is no way to
recapture its confidentiality. When determining whether the
privilege was waived, courts look to “the effect on uninhibited
consultation between attorney and client of not allowing the
privilege in these circumstances.”166 Courts need to recognize
that by the time a court is considering this after a hack, any
attempt to ensure client confidence in communications with the
attorney is simply pointless.
CONCLUSION
With hacks moving from uncommon to frequent,
individuals are much more circumspect about what they are
sending via email, especially those in high-profile jobs.167
Individuals will remain fascinated by the ability to glimpse into
private correspondence while journalists weigh the benefit of
traffic to their articles with the thought that coverage of
hacked documents—especially mundane emails—is encouraging
unnecessary hacks.168 Politicians and legislators will lament the
effect the leaks have on media coverage and even elections.169
Without a clear rule from the ABA or state bar
associations, attorneys will continue to face the ethical
dilemma of “to view or not to view” files released as part of the
hack. Courts must reevaluate the attorney-client privilege in
this age of hackers to further the goal of broad disclosure during
litigation while still practically protecting candid conversations
between attorneys and clients.
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166 Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 260
(N.D. Ill. 1981).
167 Oran, supra note 14; see Nicholas, supra note 9.
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